Marktanalysen

Market commentary March

Felix Diwok — Thu, 18 Jun 2026 15:18:07 GMT

Before the attack on Iran, the supply outlook for natural gas in Europe was clear: additional supply from the United States and Qatar was expected to increase, and prices for Cal 2027 at the TTF had fallen below EUR 25/MWh. On March 4, Cal 2027 is trading again at EUR 34/MWh, while Cal 2028 remains only slightly affected at just under EUR 26/MWh.

These positive expectations of a gas surplus have been clouded for the coming periods due to the war de-velopments in the Middle East. Over the weekend around the turn of the month from February to March 2026, a risk materialized that has hung over the global energy supply like a sword of Damocles for decades. The Strait of Hormuz, the bottleneck of oil and LNG transport, is effectively closed following the attack on Iran and the corresponding counter-reactions. Gas markets in Europe are reacting very strongly, with the short end up by around 50 percent (as of 04 March 2026, 14:45). Whether this move represents an overreac-tion or merely the beginning of a longer upward spiral depends on the dynamics of escalation. The situation will need to be reassessed on a daily basis; any answer at this point is inevitably unsatisfactory. The decisive factor is the duration of the closure, as this will determine the impact on all energy markets.

The power market in EU Europe has also risen from the yearly low of the Cal-2027 contract of around EUR 77/MWh to EUR 87/MWh. Even for the short term, a price trend cannot currently be derived with any degree of seriousness from an energy market perspective. Whether prices fall again will be negotiated in political backrooms. The entire energy complex is moving upward. A fuel switch to cheaper alternatives is also not possible, as oil and coal prices are rising as well. Electricity, as a derivative of all these fuels, is automatical-ly pulled along. This crisis is therefore unique because it is global and affects both gas and oil simultaneous-ly. We have not seen this before.

As during the energy price explosion following the Russian attack on Ukraine, the CO₂ price is currently not affected. Yet it was largely responsible for the decline in power prices in mid-February. At EUR 76/MWh, the front-year product saw a yearly low—triggered by several reports and statements about the outlook for the CO₂ market, which oscillates between the competitiveness of European industry and climate necessity. On the one hand, the cost of decarbonization required to achieve climate targets will necessitate a much higher price than the one currently traded; on the other hand, a price of EUR 100/t is considered too high. Both German Chancellor Merz and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico struck the same chord by calling for a revi-sion of the concept or a delay of the EU ETS by four to five years. This uncertainty lasted only two days be-fore the market calmed again. Nevertheless, it reflects the change in sentiment in climate policy.

Back to the Middle East. All exports from Qatar—and thus around 20% of globally produced LNG—pass through the strait in the Persian Gulf. In terms of magnitude, this is comparable to the loss of Russian pipe-line supplies in 2022, with one key difference: a permanent closure appears hardly conceivable. In the event of a prolonged closure, not only around 20% of global LNG production would be missing, but also about 20% of global oil production. Some experts speak in this context of a renewed energy crisis and oil prices of USD 100/bbl and gas prices of EUR 90/MWh. The latter would represent almost a tripling compared to the current gas price level. However, without an assessment of the duration of the war and the transport disruption, any statement would be unserious. What is clear is that a sustained reduction in supply would drive prices high enough to force a noticeable decline in demand, with corresponding effects on the global economy.

It is probably a naive idea that a military operation could create the conditions for democratic and stable structures within a maximum of four weeks. Militarily, the overarching objective is to prevent Iran from car-rying out attacks, and for energy supply and prices that is ultimately what matters. A 2025 report prepared for the US Congress helps to put this into military perspective: it mentions that Iran could disrupt the Strait of Hormuz with mines, missiles, speedboats, and other means, but that the United States would have the capability to restore shipping routes quickly, provided that no sea mines had been deployed (which corre-sponds to the current state of knowledge).

Amid all this speculation, the facts in brief (as of 04 March 2026): Currently no ships are passing through the strait. Iran has announced that it will enforce the closure. Oman reported that two ships were hit. Insurers and shipping companies are withdrawing and instructing vessels to drop anchor. Around 20 LNG carriers are already waiting west of the strait, out of a total of about 150 to 200. Ports in the Persian Gulf are still operat-ing, although there are reports of disrupted GPS signals. There are also reports that production facilities in Qatar at Ras Laffan have been attacked by drones. Other production sites in the region are beginning to bring personnel to safety, most recently at the Shaikan oil field in Iraq, which has temporarily shut down production of around 40,000 barrels per day. In addition to the transport disruption, there is therefore the real risk that production capacity could be sustainably damaged.

The analogy with 2022 helps to interpret the market reaction. When Russia invaded Ukraine, gas markets reacted violently and the front-quarter contract doubled within a few days. After that, the situation gradually calmed, and only when supply actually declined noticeably did prices rise to the record highs known today. The market evaluates not only facts but also risks. It would be presumptuous to assume that all possibilities can be assessed correctly, just as it would be too simplistic to dismiss the market reaction as implausible.

One thing must be said amid all the uncertainty: storage levels in Europe are low and increase the potential for price spikes. In the end, these price spikes will be what balances a reduction in supply through a reduc-tion in demand. Unlike previous energy crises, oil and gas are affected simultaneously. A fuel switch to heat-ing oil will therefore be economically unattractive, meaning price elasticity declines due to limited substi-tutability. Coal consumers benefit and are not affected in a comparable way. As a result, the fuel switch sepa-rates more clearly again and the price dispersion in power markets increases. The value of flexibility there-fore rises, even if it “only” allows demand to be reduced during expensive hours. At the same time, the Aus-trian premium on electricity prices will increase if the economics of gas-fired power generation deteriorate relative to coal.

We deliberately focus here on a sober analysis of energy markets. The human dimension is therefore not ignored, but remains outside the scope of this assessment. All the more, we hope for rapid de-escalation and peaceful developments. “War is the continuation of politics by other means.”

Felix Diwok
For the Inercomp team

Market commentary June

Matthias Kisslinger — Thu, 18 Jun 2026 15:06:14 GMT

As renewable energy continues to be integrated into the power system, electricity spot prices are becoming increasingly volatile, in both directions. We are seeing extreme price movements: in summer, short-term prices fall into negative territory; in winter, they spike sharply. One of these developments is no longer a seasonal side effect, but a structural feature of the changing power system. The other is mainly driven by weather and climate conditions. But first, a brief detour: what are spot prices in the first place?

The day-ahead spot market establishes, for each bidding zone, the price equilibrium between physical supply and physical demand. On the day before delivery, all market participants, from households and commercial customers to industrial consumers, forecast their consumption as well as their generation from PV, wind or gas-fired power plants, and submit the corresponding bids and offers to the power exchange.

Based on these orders, the exchange determines the clearing price for every quarter-hour of the following day. Around midday, when PV generation is high, this equilibrium price falls significantly. During periods of the well-known Dunkelflaute - prolonged low wind and little solar generation - it can rise to extraordinary levels.

The first case: negative prices

Extremely low to negative prices are an issue that regularly concerns us as critical observers of power market design. Water flowing over a weir without generating electricity is economically harmful for the system as a whole. The growing share of renewable energy in the European power mix is right and intended, but it also creates major challenges for the system. Our own calculations show that the situation will continue to intensify. For Austria, we expect around 430 hours of negative electricity prices in 2026. By 2030, this figure doubles to 900 hours, and by 2033 it rises to 1.300 hours. At the same time, the share of PV generation falling into negative-price hours increases from 18% today to more than 30% from 2031 onward. What is notable is that the average price during negative-price hours moves closer to zero in the long term. Storage expansion dampens the deepest price troughs, but it does not change the growing frequency. The problem is not getting smaller; it is becoming flatter and broader.

Power exchanges have recently responded to this development, although adjusting the minimum clearing price is more about treating symptoms than addressing causes. Under strict conditions (at least two delivery periods on at least two different days below −350 EUR/MWh) the harmonised minimum price in the day-ahead market will be lowered from −500 to −600 EUR/MWh. The reason is sobering: the previous limit was simply being reached too often. This measure does not solve the actual problem; it merely moves it 100 euros further down.

It should be a political priority to remove misaligned incentives in the system and unlock existing flexibility potential. Storage, demand response, flexible loads: all of these exist, but not at the scale required by a growing renewables-based power system. In the consultation on the System Charges Principles Ordinance, we submitted a concrete proposal: grid operators could temporarily suspend capacity charge billing. This would enable the commercial use of power-to-heat in industry, thereby substituting gas and CO2. More initiatives are urgently needed. As long as the regulatory framework does not systematically reward the expansion of flexibility, the accumulation of extreme price events will continue, regardless of how low the exchanges set their price bands. Making surplus electricity usable is the infrastructure and regulatory task of the moment.

The fact that many market participants respond only sluggishly, or not at all, to price signals is also part of the problem. The appeal is clear: conditional orders should become standard practice not only on power exchanges, but also in the marketing of renewable energy and in electricity procurement, meaning in contracts with energy suppliers. One example: a waste-to-energy plant runs baseload. That is understandable, because the waste input process leaves little flexibility. But continuous feed-in is not mandatory. If feed-in turns into a penalty, in other words, when prices fall below zero, no operator should simply have to accept that.

The second case: very high spot prices

In the past two winters, we also saw extreme upward price spikes. While the months from November to February in winter 2023/2024 still averaged 75 EUR/MWh in Austria and Germany, average prices in the following two winters were each above 100 EUR/MWh. In Austria, winter 2025/2026 reached an average of 120 EUR/MWh. The reasons for these major differences lie mainly in weather and climate conditions. Temperature and precipitation have a significant impact on both energy demand and run-of-river hydropower generation. With the ongoing expansion of wind power, available wind generation is also becoming increasingly important. Renewable energy therefore plays a decisive role not only in negative prices, but also in extremely high spot prices.

In winter 2023/2024, onshore wind power in the EU-27 generated around 184 TWh. Despite the accelerated build-out since then, this level has not been reached again. In winter 2024/2025, generation stood at 155 TWh, down 15% compared with 2023/2024. In winter 2025/2026, it reached 165 TWh, down 11%. Besides technical issues and market-driven shutdowns caused by negative prices, the vast majority of this decline is attributable to a prolonged period of below-average wind speeds across large parts of Europe.

The key question is whether this is a lasting development or a statistical outlier. In 2025, atmospheric conditions over Europe were shaped by blocking high-pressure systems over Central and Northwestern Europe. These disrupted the westerly flow and led to stable, low-wind conditions - in winter, a typical Dunkelflaute. The cause was a northward shift in the jet stream, which moved the main storm tracks to higher latitudes. As a result, regions such as France and Germany experienced fewer and weaker low-pressure systems. For 2026, most models do not expect any noticeable improvement in wind availability, as an El Niño event is expected in summer.
The medium-term outlook suggests that the weak wind conditions of the past two years are a statistical outlier rather than a structural trend. Analyses of historical wind data for Europe from 1996 to 2025 show no significant trend in either direction. The low-wind years 2024 and 2025 are interpreted as natural climate variability. Some studies suggest slightly declining wind speeds over Europe under stronger global warming, but these findings remain subject to considerable uncertainty due to the complexity of climate interactions.

What follows from this?

The high spot prices were driven less by regulation than by weather and climate conditions, namely lower wind power generation. Negative prices, by contrast, are a direct consequence of missed adjustments to the massive PV expansion of recent years. The transformation of the power system is fully under way, and policymakers must create the conditions to make surplus electricity usable through flexibility technologies. The energy industry, for its part, must do its homework and make conditional orders standard practice.

Current spot prices show just how relevant these structural issues remain. On the German spot market, the weekly average at the end of May stood at 94,90 EUR/MWh, and June is starting at an even higher level. The decisive factor is weak expected wind generation, at only around 82% of the seasonal norm. May 2026 is also an exception in year-on-year comparison. In 2025, May was still the cheapest month of the year, with an average price of 67,34 EUR/MWh. In 2024, prices were at a similar level. In 2026, however, May reached a remarkable 97,54 EUR/MWh, 45% above the previous years and the highest May price ever, if the crisis year 2022 is excluded. In addition to weak wind supply, below-average hydrology is also weighing on price levels. The global energy market situation adds further pressure: futures markets are currently showing little movement, with prices remaining elevated as market participants wait for a possible agreement between the United States and Iran. The more likely an agreement appears, the more prices tend to move downward; the more disruptions become public, the greater the upward pressure.

Market commentary May

Matthias Kisslinger — Thu, 18 Jun 2026 15:05:06 GMT

The fossil fuel crisis is affecting the energy sector across three time horizons. First, there are immediate consequences for market developments in April. At the same time, the EU is adopting energy policy measures to cushion energy costs for industry. In the long-term outlook, however, a drastic change of course across the entire economic structure will still be necessary.

A brief look back: The ceasefire in the Iran conflict, together with diplomatic initiatives in April, brought energy prices down from their peak. Prices did not return to pre-conflict levels, but a clear easing was visible. TTF gas prices for the front year are moving just below EUR 40/MWh, while the German power front year is hovering around EUR 90/MWh. Overall, the market reaction is currently subdued: Asia is importing significantly less LNG or substituting it with other fuels through fuel switching. Global price competition therefore remains muted for the time being. Nevertheless, the Strait of Hormuz is de facto closed, which brings the risk of major price volatility.

The following can be expected for May: As there is no indication of a lasting solution to the Iran conflict, rising prices are more than possible. The upward trend in gas prices could also pull electricity prices higher. On the spot markets, prices are already expected to rise in the first week of May due to low renewable generation. However, if diplomatic efforts prove promising, prices could also quickly fall to a lower level.

In addition to managing the short-term consequences, the EU is pushing ahead with energy policy relief measures. In April, the Commission approved state aid schemes in Germany, Bulgaria and Slovenia intended to enable lower electricity prices for energy-intensive companies. The basis for this is the Clean Industrial Deal State Aid Framework (CISAF), which the Commission had only adopted in the summer of 2025. The rapid use of this framework shows the political pressure to protect industry from high energy costs.

The CISAF sets clear guardrails: support may cover no more than half of annual electricity consumption; the reduced price may not fall below EUR 50/MWh; and at least 50% of the aid must be reinvested in decarbonisation measures. Only companies from sectors with an increased risk of carbon leakage are eligible to apply, meaning sectors where production may be relocated to countries with lower environmental standards. These include the chemical, metal, paper, glass and semiconductor industries, for example. Many parts of the manufacturing sector therefore remain excluded.

Only limited details are known about the national designs. Germany has provided by far the largest budget, at EUR 3.8 billion; the aid will be paid out annually in arrears through the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA) and calculated on the basis of the average EEX futures market price of the previous year. This is also likely to influence companies’ procurement strategies. Bulgaria has budgeted EUR 334 million, was the first EU country to activate the support, and pays out the relief monthly through electricity suppliers. Slovenia has chosen a middle path, with EUR 90 million and semi-annual payments. All three schemes have one thing in common: they are limited to three years and do not permanently solve the structural challenge of high energy costs. The reinvestment obligation is positive because it does not merely use public funds to cover ongoing costs, but channels them into technologies that relieve the electricity system in the long term without promoting fossil fuels.

The interaction with existing support mechanisms is important, especially with electricity price compensation. The two instruments can be combined, but not for the same electricity volumes. For consumption volumes for which electricity price compensation is applied for in the respective accounting year, the industrial electricity price is excluded. Companies must therefore weigh up which instrument is more economically advantageous; for many electricity-intensive businesses, electricity price compensation may be more attractive.

In Austria, the opening of the portal for the “Industriestrombonus” was announced at the same time. Although the term is similar to “Industriestrompreis”, or industrial electricity price, it refers to a different measure: electricity price compensation, legally anchored in the Standort-Absicherungs-Gesetz, which compensates energy-intensive businesses for indirect CO₂ costs that electricity producers pass on through emissions trading. The instrument is generally provided for under EU state aid law, but had been suspended in Austria in recent years. The fact that Austria is now starting without final EU approval carries regulatory risk, but is politically understandable: EUR 75 million is available retroactively for 2025, and around 60 companies from the paper and steel industries are waiting for relief. A separate industrial electricity price based on the German model remains under discussion, but has not yet been decided due to the strained budget situation.

Taken together, this creates a picture typical of European energy policy: different instruments, national designs, and a common framework that leaves considerable room for interpretation. Whether these measures will actually strengthen industrial competitiveness while also triggering investment in a decarbonised energy supply will only become clear in the coming years.

Looking at the longer-term development: Because of the acute crisis, the International Energy Agency (IEA) expects a drastic change of direction in the markets, similar to the period after the oil crises of the 1970s. “I believe there will be a massive response to this crisis on the energy side,” said IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol at the Petersberg Climate Dialogue in Berlin. A look back: In 1960, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela founded OPEC, which had grown to 12 member states by 1973 and was intended to represent the interests of oil-producing countries. With clear parallels to today’s events, a military conflict destabilised the situation: on the occasion of the Yom Kippur War in autumn 1973, OPEC reduced its production volumes by 5%. Within one year, the oil price quadrupled from USD 3 per barrel to USD 12 per barrel.

High-consumption countries responded with efficiency, restraint and investment. Whereas cars had previously used 20 litres of fuel per 100 kilometres, consumption had fallen to half that level after the crisis, Birol emphasised. In Germany, the Energy Security Act was passed, on the basis of which a driving ban applied on car-free Sundays. In addition, there was a speed limit of 100 km/h on motorways. Comparable measures are being called for today by climate policy circles, but are meeting with considerable resistance. Austria, incidentally, also responded with one car-free day per week in January 1974 for a period of five weeks - and with the so-called energy holidays. To save heating oil, schoolchildren were given one week off in early February, now known as the semester break.

In addition to financing higher levels of efficiency, funds at the time were invested above all in alternative technologies. Renewables played hardly any role; the government of the day primarily created greater independence through nuclear power, which is currently gaining importance again. So-called Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are to be subsidised by the EU, and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has described the move away from nuclear power as a “strategic mistake”. Whether this form of energy should be reactivated is controversial - especially with regard to the long-term responsibility for final storage and safety. At the same time, investment in renewable energy continues to advance. This also fits with the conference currently taking place in Colombia, where 60 countries aim to define a roadmap for phasing out fossil fuels.

Fatih Birol believes that today we are better prepared for a change of direction than we were 50 years ago. The necessary technologies are available, including renewable energy and electric vehicles. The question is: do policymakers and society want this transformation? If markets, history - and reason - have their way, we will not be able to avoid it. Otherwise, we risk facing the economic consequences that Germany had to deal with one year after the oil price crisis. In 1974, an economic crisis brought short-time work, unemployment and company insolvencies.

The global energy sector stands at a crossroads. Markets are currently reacting cautiously, while political measures are being prepared and profound structural changes are emerging.

Matthias Kisslinger
for the Inercomp Team

Market commentary April

Matthias Kisslinger — Thu, 18 Jun 2026 15:01:37 GMT

The ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States continues to shape international energy markets. What began as a geopolitical confrontation has meanwhile escalated into a regional conflict with direct implications for energy infrastructure in Iran and the Gulf states. Its effects are now being felt well beyond the region: substantial price increases can be observed across nearly all conventional energy commodities. As a result, the risk of renewed inflationary pressure is growing — from higher fuel prices and rising procurement costs to broader burdens on industry and the overall economy. Experts are already referring to a fossil energy crisis and an oil and gas price shock of historic proportions.
After one month of military escalation, the overall situation remains unresolved. What is clearly visible, however, are the developments on commodity and forward markets: the TTF front-month gas price rose from EUR 32/MWh in early March to EUR 54/MWh in early April. Over the same period, the German power price for calendar year 2027 increased from EUR 81/MWh to EUR 94/MWh. Front-year coal prices rose from EUR 98/t to EUR 133/t, while prompt oil prices climbed from USD 70 to USD 112 per barrel. Following the sharp surge at the beginning of the month, momentum has eased somewhat, but volatility remains elevated. At one point, the TTF front-month contract fell by 9% within a single week, while daily price swings of 5% to 6% have become more the rule than the exception. At the same time, the oil market is witnessing one of the steepest price increases in recent history. For European consumers, this means not only heightened media attention, but also tangible cost increases. Reassuring statements from the United States suggesting that the global oil market remains adequately supplied have so far failed to calm markets.
Particularly severe are the implications for international energy trade. Roughly one fifth of global oil and gas trade is affected by the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Whereas the strait had previously seen between 80 and 120 vessels pass through each day — around half of them tankers — current traffic has been reduced to only a small number of ships. Passage is effectively limited to selected countries, including Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Thailand and China. In March alone, an estimated 95 TWh of LNG exports were lost as a result. QatarEnergy has declared force majeure vis-à-vis the Italian utility Edison and cancelled ten LNG cargoes through mid-June. Replacement deliveries appear possible in principle, but only at significantly higher prices. Europe has not yet experienced acute supply shortages, but the situation is deteriorating and EU energy ministers are currently coordinating crisis response measures.
At the same time, geopolitical escalation continues. On the last weekend of March, Houthi units from Yemen launched attacks on Israel for the first time, extending the conflict toward Bab el-Mandeb, another strategic chokepoint in global trade located in the southwestern part of the Arabian Peninsula. As a result, not only energy markets but also industrial commodity markets are coming under increasing pressure. The world’s largest single-site aluminium plant has been shut down; overall, around 10% of global aluminium supply originates from the Gulf states.
Saudi Arabia is attempting to offset part of the disruption. Exports are being rerouted via the East-West Pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, most recently at a volume of around 4.6 million barrels per day. While substantial, this volume replaces only part of the quantities that had previously passed through the Strait of Hormuz each day. Should Saudi infrastructure on the Red Sea also become a target of attack, this alternative route would likewise be at risk. JP Morgan has already outlined a possible next scenario: in such a case, Saudi oil would need to be rerouted via the SUMED pipeline through Egypt to the Mediterranean, implying longer transport routes and correspondingly higher costs.
The real-economy consequences now extend well beyond energy markets. South Korea, which covers around 70% of its oil demand from the Middle East, is reportedly considering nationwide driving restrictions for private vehicles for the first time since the 1991 Gulf War. Sri Lanka has raised electricity tariffs by more than 7% and is struggling to secure sufficient crude oil supplies for its only refinery. Globally, the risk of shortages in physical goods such as fertilisers and grain is also rising. In Europe, the impact is currently felt most directly by industry, where rising production costs are likely to become increasingly inflationary. This is the core economic risk — comparable to the gas shortage of 2022. If tight supply conditions persist, energy market pricing could become entrenched at levels at which industrial consumers are no longer able to operate economically, because short-term variable costs exceed achievable product prices. At a gas price of EUR 54/MWh, some sectors are already moving back into critical territory — despite prices still being significantly below the peaks seen in 2022. German economic research institutes have already revised their 2026 growth forecasts downward.
At the European level, a range of political and regulatory options is currently under discussion: price caps, the clawback of windfall profits from energy producers, an accelerated build-out of renewable energy infrastructure, stronger coordination among member states, and demand-reduction measures extending to transport policy interventions. Lithuania, for example, has halved rail ticket prices in an effort to shift mobility from road to rail. On 31 March 2026, the European Commission prepared member states for a prolonged period of elevated fuel prices. At the same time, measures to refill gas storage facilities and safeguard oil supply are being coordinated. The Commission is also calling on consumers to reduce energy consumption, particularly in the transport sector.
How the situation will evolve remains difficult to assess, as geopolitical dynamics are currently overshadowing traditional market fundamentals. The widely anticipated LNG supply surplus expected from rising global liquefaction capacity from this summer is unlikely to materialise for the time being. Additional escalation risks stem from the possibility of broader US military involvement. Even in the event of a near-term political de-escalation, it would likely take three to four months for the remaining Qatari facilities — representing around 83% of total capacity — to return to full utilisation. The restoration of destroyed infrastructure is likely to take considerably longer. Until then, the market will remain short of a significant volume of LNG supply. Against this backdrop, EU Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen has warned that even a rapid peace agreement would not result in a near-term return to previous market normality.
Political signals from the United States have so far failed to calm markets. At the same time, as of 1 April, signs of diplomatic initiatives are increasing following indications of a possible US withdrawal and intensified mediation efforts by China and Pakistan. In this environment, careful assessment of price and procurement risks remains highly important. From today’s perspective, we continue to see more upside than downside potential in the short term. At the same time, a measured and balanced approach remains essential.
Finally, we would like to reiterate that our aim remains to provide the most objective possible analysis of market developments. This does not diminish the human tragedy of armed conflict and the suffering it causes; rather, these dimensions lie deliberately outside the immediate scope of this market commentary. All the more, we hope for rapid de-escalation and a peaceful resolution of the situation.
Matthias Kisslinger
for the Inercomp Team